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legal update
USING VOLUNTARY 
ADMINISTRATION TO DILUTE 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDINGS
The New Bounty case and using a DOCA to dilute minority 
shareholdings as part of a distressed M&A strategy.
JASON HARRIS
Associate Professor, 
UTS Faculty of Law
Voluntary administration
Voluntary administration (VA) was introduced in the early 1990s in order to provide a mechanism 
to save businesses in financial 
distress, or if that was not possible to 
provide breathing space during the 
administration to facilitate a better 
result for creditors and members 
than an immediate liquidation. These 
goals are set out in s 435A of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
The numbers of companies in 
voluntary administration peaked in 
the FY05-06 with 2,784 companies 
entering VA (which made up 35 percent 
of all companies entering external 
administration that year). Since that 
time, and particularly since the 2007 
changes made creditors’ voluntary 
liquidations easier, the numbers 
of companies using voluntary 
administration have declined 
dramatically and they now make up 
just 13.5 percent of all companies 
entering external administration 
(1,248 in FY14-15).1
Some have questioned whether 
voluntary administration is still 
effective and whether it needs a 
fundamental reform. However, 
declining appointment numbers do 
not indicate that VA is no longer useful 
or that it will not provide a flexible and 
effective solution for certain types 
of situations faced by distressed 
businesses and their advisors.
Distressed mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) are an important 
area of business for ARITA members, 
with recent matters such as Mirabela 
Nickel and Nexus Energy producing 
a great deal of attention in the press 
and the general business community.2
There are of course many ways to 
structure a distressed M&A deal, but 
one common tool is to use a debt for 
equity swap.3 This article considers 
the use of a debt for equity swap in 
the recent case of Re New Bounty 
Pty Ltd; Winpar Holdings Ltd v Baron 
Corporation Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 
1060 (decided by Sackville AJA on 
5 August 2015).
This case involved a DOCA being 
entered into for the purpose of 
swapping debt for over 1.5 billion 
shares. The share issue resulted 
in the DOCA proponent (the major 
1 Source: ASIC Insolvency Statistics, Series 1 (companies entering EXAD), September 2015. 2 Re Mirabela Nickel Ltd [2014] NSWSC 836; Re Nexus Energy (2014) 105 ACSR 246; [2014] 
NSWSC 1910. See also Edwards and Tucker, ‘Mirabela Nickel-resurrected, rescued and relisted’ (2014) 26[2] A Insol J 12; Crittenden and Bowden, ‘The Nexus administration: court 
sanctioned share transfer the last step in the company’s restructure via a DOCA’ (2015) 16 Insolvency Law Bulletin 70. 3 See further Howard and Hedger, Restructuring Law and 
Practice, 2nd ed, 2013, LexisNexis Butterworths, Ch 6 pp. 321-404; Clowry ‘Debt for equity swaps’ in Larkin (ed), Restructuring and Workouts, 2nd ed, 2013, Globe Law and Business, 
Ch 3 pp. 29-58. 
secured creditor of the company) and 
its associates owning 99.4 percent 
of the voting shares in the company, 
with minority shareholders diluted 
from 9.3 percent of the shares in the 
company down to 0.6 percent.
What is interesting in this case is 
that despite the court holding that:
• the shares were issued for an 
improper purpose
• the administration produced no 
practical benefit to the company 
or its creditors
• the share issue was made to 
dilute minority shareholders; and
• the administration was for an 
improper purpose
the administration was not set aside.
This article examines the New Bounty 
case and discusses how, following 
the case, voluntary administrations 
and DOCAs can be used to dilute 
minority shareholdings as part of a 
distressed M&A strategy. However, 
before considering the New Bounty 
case it is useful to review how the 
appointment of an administrator 
affects the issue of shares.
ARITA Journal, March 2016, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 22-27.
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ISSUING SHARES DURING 
VOLUNTARY ADMINISTRATION
Readers of the Journal are no doubt 
familiar with the effect of voluntary 
administration on the operation of the 
company, however a brief summary is 
useful.
The appointment of an 
administrator will suspend the powers 
of the directors of the company: 
Corporations Act s 437C. This prevents 
the directors from exercising their 
management power (pursuant to 
s 198A) to issue shares under s 254A.
Furthermore, only the 
administrator can deal with the 
company’s property: s 437D. Transfers 
of shares during administration are 
prohibited under s 437F. However, each 
of these prohibitions are subject to 
an exception where the administrator 
gives written consent prior to the 
exercise of power or dealing with the 
company’s property.
Given the directors are not 
automatically removed by the 
appointment of the administrator,4 it is 
open to the administrator to allow the 
directors to issue new shares during 
the administration of the company. 
The management power given to the 
administrator under s 437A is broad 
enough to allow the administrator to 
issue shares in the company under 
s 254A.5
It is not possible for an 
administrator or the directors to 
transfer shares of existing members 
without their permission,6 although 
some closely held companies may 
have arrangements in place to 
require minority shareholders to sell 
their shares through compulsory 
acquisitions or options to purchase 
in the constitution, or through ‘drag 
along’ provisions in a shareholders’ 
agreement.7 This is unlikely in large 
publicly listed companies however.
For companies that enter into a 
DOCA the deed administrator does 
not have the benefit of s 437A (as 
administration has ended at that point: 
s 435C(2)(a)), but is given a default 
power to ‘enter into and complete 
any contract for the sale of shares 
in the company’ under Sch 8A of the 
Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) 
cl 2(zc). This has been held by the 
courts to not include the power to 
issue new shares.8
A deed administrator can only 
transfer shares held by existing 
shareholders without their consent 
by obtaining court approval under 
s 444GA. The powers conferred on 
deed administrators by default under 
Sch 8A are more specific than the 
broad statutory power of management 
under s 437A and do not provide a 
general management power that would 
allow new share issues to be made.
The default provisions in Sch 8A 
can be replaced by an arrangement 
where existing management are 
expressly given some power (including 
the power to issue shares): s 444A(5); 
Reg 5.3A.06. If the DOCA does not 
exclude the management powers 
of the directors then they retain the 
power to issue shares, although being 
bound by the DOCA they must not do 
4 Although the administrator has the power to remove and replace directors: s 442A. 5 See O’Donovan, Company Receivers and Administrators (loose leaf and online), Westlaw AU, 
[54.550]. 6 It is possible that the compulsory acquisition powers in Corporations Act Pt 6A.2 may be available, but the timing limitations and the dispute resolution procedure for 
dissenting shareholders would require a lengthy extension of the convening period that would make this option unlikely. 7 See further Damon, ‘The legal aspects of venture capital 
agreements: Part 1’ (2007) 25 Company and Securities Law Journal 43. 8 Cresvale Far East Ltd v Cresvale Securities Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 394; [2001] NSWSC 89 (overturned in part, 
although not concerning this finding: Kirwin v Cresvale Far East Ltd (2002) 44 ACSR 21; [2002] NSWCA 395). See also Murray and Taylor, Australian Insolvency Management Practice 
Commentary (loose leaf and online), CCH IntelliConnect, [56-630]. 9 See further Cresvale Far East Ltd v Cresvale Securities Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 394; [2001] NSWSC 89. 10 Kirwin v 
Cresvale Far East Ltd (2002) 44 ACSR 21; [2002] NSWCA 395. 11 At [302]. 
so inconsistently with the operation of 
the DOCA: s 444G.9
Whoever issues the shares, either 
during administration or a during a 
DOCA, the power must be exercised 
for a proper purpose under s 181. It 
has been held that it is not necessarily 
an improper purpose to issue shares 
in order to obtain control of a company 
where the transaction is providing 
necessary capital to the company 
in exchange for the share issue, 
particularly if there are no other 
funding sources.
In the Cresvale appeal,10 Young (CJ in 
equity) explained:
if a company has need of capital and 
there is only one avenue of obtaining 
that capital, then even though the 
person who is subscribing the extra 
capital and has a dominant purpose in 
obtaining control and even though that 
person is a director of the company, 
there would be no improper purpose 
in making the allotment. The rules set 
out in the authorities and the textbooks 
are rules that apply in ordinary 
circumstances (if they ever exist) and 
are not to be applied unthinkingly 
to every situation. One must judge 
each case as to whether in all the 
circumstances of the case there was 
an equitable fraud in the exercise of 
the power to issue shares.11
Whoever issues the shares, either 
during administration or a during a 
DOCA, the power must be exercised 
for a proper purpose under s 181 of 
the Corporations Act.
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It should be borne in mind though 
that whoever issues the shares will 
have equitable duties imposed on the 
power to issue shares which allow an 
individual shareholder to challenge 
the share issue as an equitable 
fraud on a power if exercised for an 
improper purpose.12
With these points in mind, let’s now 
discuss the recent case of New Bounty 
where the deed administrator issued 
1.5 billion shares as part of a DOCA 
in order for the DOCA proponent to 
take over the business by controlling 
99 percent of the shares.
THE NEW BOUNTY CASE
New Bounty Pty Ltd was part of a 
group of companies controlled by 
textile businessman Phil Bart. New 
Bounty had previously been a publicly 
listed company called National 
Textiles Ltd, which should be well 
known to ARITA members as the 
company that gave rise to government 
support of employee entitlements in 
insolvent companies, now covered by 
the Fair Entitlements Guarantee Act 
2012 (Cth).13
Mr Bart was a major shareholder 
in National Textiles prior to its 
collapse and then increased his 
shares to nearly 90 percent of 
the company (through a range of 
controlled entities) following its 
insolvency. Mr Bart then changed its 
name and took it private, although the 
company maintained approximately 
10 percent outside shareholders.
Mr Bart tried unsuccessfully over 
the years to acquire the shares of 
minority shareholders and then in 2012 
resorted (through a controlled entity 
Baron Corp) to using the compulsory 
acquisition powers under Pt 6A of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which 
allow 90 percent holders to serve 
compulsory acquisition notices on 
the minority, albeit with processes for 
dealing with opposition.
Several shareholders lodged 
objections to the proposal and 
proceedings were commenced in the 
Tasmanian Supreme Court seeking 
approval of the acquisition.
Companies controlled by Mr Bart 
had long provided secured loan 
facilities to New Bounty and other 
companies in the group. One of these 
creditors, Baron Corp Pty Ltd, took an 
assignment of a secured loan that was 
originally extended to New Bounty by 
another company controlled by Mr Bart 
more than 10 years before.
Various group loans were also 
consolidated into a single facility held 
by New Bart. Importantly, the original 
loans did not automatically include 
interest, although they allowed for 
interest to be charged on non-payment 
12 See Residues Treatment & Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (1988) 14 ACLR 569. 13. See Anderson, The protection of employee entitlements in insolvency, 2014, MUP. 
Voluntary administration
or where the lender gave written 
notice that interest would be 
charged.
Changes to the New Bounty loans 
by a deed of variation in 2011 resulted 
in interest being chargeable from 
the date of the first loan (made in 
1999). In 2013, after the compulsory 
acquisition was launched, the New 
Bounty loan was assigned from New 
Bart to Baron Corp.
After delays in resolving the 
compulsory acquisition proposal 
Mr Bart decided that another course 
of action may be preferable. That 
course of action involved discussions 
with an insolvency practitioner 
about the potential for a voluntary 
administration for New Bounty which 
could result in a DOCA that involved 
swapping interest on the loan from 
Baron Corp for shares in New Bounty 
that would heavily dilute existing 
minority shareholdings.
Thereafter New Bart sold its 
shares in New Bounty to Baron Corp, 
which then became the 90 percent 
holder and launched the compulsory 
acquisition process. Thus, Baron 
Corp was both the major secured 
creditor and the majority shareholder 
of New Bounty. At this time, an 
independent valuation of New Bounty 
valued its shares at nil. While the 
company had some assets and had 
low levels of non-group debts, the 
continued trading of the company 
depended upon continued funding 
from Mr Bart’s companies.
The major asset of New Bounty 
was an intra group loan that 
was unlikely to be repaid due 
to restructuring of the group’s 
operations and a significant 
environmental remediation order 
imposed on the borrower to the New 
Bounty loan. Clearly, if Mr Bart did 
The DOCA also involved the deed 
administrators causing the company 
to issue more than 1.5 billion shares 
in New Bounty to Baron Corp at one 
quarter of 1 cent per share.
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not wish to continue financial support 
these companies would need to enter 
liquidation as they would be insolvent.
Shortly after seeing an insolvency 
practitioner to seek advice on 
voluntary administration Mr Bart 
informed the other New Bounty 
director that he was going to resign 
and Baron Corp would call its loan in. 
Mr Bart then resigned as a director of 
New Bounty and Baron Corp issued a 
notice of demand on New Bounty for 
repayment of more than $4.5 million, 
which was owed under the secured 
loan of almost $800,000 with the 
balance being interest.
The following day the sole 
remaining director of New Bounty 
placed the company into voluntary 
administration as it was unable to 
pay the amount and was (in his view) 
insolvent.
The administration lasted for just 
over a month and on 12 May 2014 the 
creditors resolved for the company 
to enter into a deed of company 
arrangement proposed by Baron 
Corp. Under the DOCA, all creditors’ 
claims would be paid in full (by a 
DOCA fund provided by Baron Corp), 
although there were few non-related 
party creditors and the company had 
sufficient cash reserves to pay these 
debts in full anyway.
The DOCA also involved the deed 
administrators causing the company 
to issue more than 1.5 billion shares 
in New Bounty to Baron Corp at 
one quarter of 1 cent per share. 
The consideration for the share 
issue was for Baron Corp to forgive 
New Bounty’s loan interest (but not 
principal) of $3.7 million. However, the 
company would need the support of 
Baron Corp to remain solvent.
The share issue resulted in 
increasing Baron Corp’s shares 
in New Bounty from 90.7 percent 
to 99.4 percent. The minority 
shareholders had their shares 
decreased from 9.3 percent to 
0.6 percent. Winpar Holdings Ltd held 
two-thirds of the minority shares.
After the DOCA terminated due 
to its completion, Mr Bart was 
reappointed to the New Bounty board. 
Winpar then commenced proceedings 
in the NSW Supreme Court seeking 
various orders under s 447A and 
s 1324 so as to reverse the issue of 
shares. This was an attempt to vary 
the DOCA so as to preserve the DOCA 
fund but to prevent the shares being 
issued.
Winpar argued that Mr Bart had 
abused his position as a director in 
order to gain improper benefits for 
himself and for Baron Corp. Winpar 
also argued that the appointment of 
the administrator was for an improper 
purpose and that the DOCA was being 
used to circumvent the procedures 
set out in Pt 6A of the Corporations 
Act. Winpar did not allege any 
misconduct by the administrators.
ISSUES
The issues before the court were:
1. Was the administration an abuse of 
Pt 5.3A?
2. Could s 447A orders be used to 
undo the share issue?
3. Would the court order the company 
to undo the share issue?
The court answered these questions: 
yes, no and no.
DECISION
Abuse of Pt 5.3A
Mr Bart admitted that he acted to 
make the company insolvent but 
claimed that there were a range 
of commercial advantages that 
14 At [204]. 
motivated the transactions, including 
returning New Bounty to solvency, 
obtaining tax benefits, resolving the 
dispute regarding the compulsory 
acquisition. However, the court held 
that the primary motivating factor 
was obtaining almost complete 
ownership by diluting the minority 
shareholdings.
The DOCA did not return the 
company to solvency as it still owed 
considerable amounts to related 
party creditors. The DOCA fund was 
unnecessary as the company always 
had sufficient cash reserves to meet 
unrelated creditor claims.
Furthermore, Baron Corp 
stated it had ‘lost patience’ with the 
‘shennanigans’ over the compulsory 
acquisition as the reason it was 
calling in the loan. The court 
also rejected the argument that 
the enforcement of the loan was 
simply Baron Corp enforcing its 
legal rights, finding that this was 
an ‘necessary step’ in the plan 
by Mr Bart to dilute the minority 
shareholders.
This was based in large part by 
the steps that Mr Bart took prior to 
enforcement (i.e. meeting with an 
insolvency practitioner to discuss 
the options, formulating a plan, 
discussing it with the other director 
and advising the other director 
that the firm of administrators who 
advised Mr Bart could be appointed 
and if this did occur a DOCA 
involving a debt for equity swap may 
be supported by Baron Corp).
The court held that if the 
dominant purpose of the 
administration was to dilute the 
minority shareholdings this would 
be an abuse of Pt 5.3A because it 
did not meet the goals set out in 
s 435A.14 The court said:
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This is not a case in which Mr Bart 
intended to utilise Pt 5.3A of the 
Corporations Act to achieve a result 
contemplated by the legislation, 
while also having an ulterior purpose 
outside the scope of the legislation. 
His intention and purpose was to 
utilise Pt 5.3A to achieve an object not 
contemplated by the legislation and 
thus outside its scope.15
The court also held that Mr Bart had 
continued to act as an officer of the 
company despite his resignation from 
the board. Mr Bart:
• Recommended that the remaining 
director appoint an administrator 
and suggested who the 
administrators should be (the firm 
that had previously advised him)
• Was involved in drafting the DOCA 
(the other director of New Bounty 
was not) which included answering 
queries on the draft DOCA from the 
administrators
• Instructed the solicitors who 
acted for both New Bounty and 
Baron Corp
• Procured creditor votes in favour of 
the DOCA.
The court therefore held that 
although Mr Bart did not appoint 
the administrator (as he was not a 
director at the time), his involvement 
in the process justified attributing 
his improper purpose for the 
administration to the company.16
Use of s 447A orders
The court then considered whether the 
share issue by the administrator could 
be set aside by using s 447A orders. 
There is authority for the use of s 447A 
orders to vary or terminate a DOCA,17 
but Winpar sought to vary the DOCA 
by rescinding the share issue while 
keeping the DOCA fund in place. This 
cut at the heart of the DOCA which was 
to produce the debt for equity swap. 
Specifically, Winpar has sought orders 
under s 447A that would:
• Empower the court to set aside 
clauses in the DOCA
• Change the wording of s 437A so 
that the administrators could not 
issue shares
• Change the operation of Pt 5.3A to 
allow the court to require the share 
transferee to retransfer the shares 
back to New Bounty
• Require the company to rescind the 
share issue, cancel the shares and 
rectify the register of members.
The court noted that the High Court 
in Australasian Memory Pty Ltd v Brien 
(2000) 200 CLR 270 had found that s 
447A orders could be made once the 
company’s administration had ended 
(in that case resulting in a creditors’ 
voluntary liquidation) as long as the 
orders only take effect from the date 
that they are made.
His Honour was prepared to accept 
that s 447A orders could be made to 
effect a DOCA that had terminated, not 
for the purpose of validating actions 
taken under the former deed but to 
vary the former deed, however ‘such 
circumstances are likely to be rare’.18 
The court held that the orders sought 
could not be given because they sought 
to give the court a power that it did not 
have under Pt 5.3A and therefore were 
not orders about ‘how Pt 5.3A is to 
operate’.19
The court held that the proposed 
orders would be inconsistent with 
s 445H which provides that the 
termination of a DOCA does not affect 
anything that has been done under the 
DOCA. In this case the shares were 
issued and the DOCA terminated. At 
Voluntary administration
15 At [206]. 16 At [113]. 17 See Re GIGA Investments Pty Ltd (1995) 17 ACSR 547; Erol v Cavus [2012] QSC 371. 18 At [224]. 19 At [225]. 20 At [227]-[230].
the time the shares were issued the 
administrator had the power to do so, 
and the share issue was not invalid.
The court rejected the application to 
use s 447A to retrospectively invalidate 
the share issue. Section 447A orders 
are not retrospective and can’t be used 
to invalidate actions taken under a 
DOCA that were valid at the time.20
The court also rejected the 
proposed order that s 447A could 
change the operation of Pt 5.3A so as 
to give the court the power to order 
the share transferee to retransfer 
the shares back to New Bounty, as 
such an order was not about ‘how 
Pt 5.3A is to operate’ it would be to give 
Pt 5.3A a power that was not otherwise 
available.
The court also decided that even if 
s 447A did allow the proposed orders, 
Winpar had waited too long to make its 
application to challenge the DOCA and 
now that both the share issue and the 
operation of the DOCA were complete 
it was a relevant consideration in 
exercising discretion. Furthermore, 
varying the DOCA by rescinding the 
share issue would be likely to leave 
the company without the continued 
support of Mr Bart’s companies and 
hence insolvent.
Other relief?
Winpar also sought orders under 
s 1324 of the Corporations Act (the 
statutory injunction provision) that 
would prevent any person from relying 
upon the clauses in the DOCA that it 
sought to have deleted. These orders 
were based on allegations that Mr Bart 
had breached his directors’ duties and 
that there had been impermissible 
financial assistance to allow the 
purchase of the shares (a breach of 
s 260A).
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The court held that as Mr Bart had 
not been joined as a party to the case 
it was inappropriate to rule on whether 
he had breached his directors’ duties. 
Furthermore, the orders against 
Baron particularly where it had not be 
established by Winpar that Baron was 
‘involved’ in any alleged contravention 
by Mr Bart while he acted as an officer 
of New Bounty. The court also rejected 
that the administrator’s issue of shares 
involved financial assistance so that no 
breach of s 260A was established.
VALUABLE LESSONS
The result of the New Bounty case is 
that an administration commenced 
for an improper purpose, which 
constituted an abuse of Pt 5.3A 
and resulted in 1.5 billion shares 
being issued in order to squeeze 
out minority shareholders, did not 
produce any adverse results for the 
director or company involved. There 
was no suggestion by the applicant 
or by the court’s reasons that the 
administrators acted improperly.
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However, there are valuable lessons 
to learn from this case for future 
distressed M&A transactions.
Firstly, the administration needs 
to satisfy the statutory purposes in 
s 435A. In this case the administration 
and DOCA didn’t assist the company to 
return to solvency and didn’t provide 
any better return for creditors than 
liquidation. Following on from the Bell 
litigation, it is important that there be 
prospects of a plan for the company 
to return to solvency or to improve 
returns to creditors.
In this case the conversion rate 
for the debt to equity swap could 
only be explained as an attempt to 
comprehensively dilute the minority 
holdings. Of course an order under 
s 444GA could have been sought, but 
that would have required positive 
evidence of no unfair prejudice which 
may have been difficult to prove 
given the compulsory acquisition 
proceedings on foot.
Secondly, the potential conflicts 
of interests do not appear to have 
been managed well in this case. The 
controller of the company attempted 
to formally distance himself from 
the transaction but took an active 
role in formulating the DOCA and 
responding to queries from advisors. 
He appeared on multiple sides of 
the transaction at the same time. It 
goes without saying that insolvency 
practitioners need to always be 
mindful of in what capacity a person 
is acting.
Thirdly, when applying for orders 
under s 447A it is important that they 
are squarely focused on modifying 
a provision in Pt 5.3A, not trying to 
create powers that are not otherwise 
there.
Lastly, it is important to make 
an application to challenge a DOCA 
as soon as possible. Leaving the 
challenge until after the DOCA has 
completed and has been terminated 
may dramatically limit the relief 
available. 
Editor’s note: Jason Harris leads the University of 
Technology Sydney team that develops and delivers 
the ARITA Advanced Certification course.
